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Commercial Speech and Paid Access
To the Press
By P. CAMERON DEVoRE* and MARSHALL . NELSON*
AFTER the epic confrontations between government and the press
in recent years, there is a tendency to view the newsroom and editorial
page as the exclusive battlegrounds of the First Amendment, and in
terms of direct assaults on freedom of the press, this view may be justi-
fied. But as any media lawyer knows or soon learns, the day to day
crises are just as likely to arise in the advertising department. They
may lack some of the drama of a subpoena for news sources or a politi-
cal expos6, but they lack nothing in complexity of the legal issues
raised.
A major cause of the complexity is -the simple fact that advertisers
usually pay for access to the newspaper' in order to sell something.
The advertiser may see this fact as converting the press into his own
personal forum and as entitling him to a First Amendment guarantee
against interference by the newspaper itself. To a court, on the other
hand, it may trigger the magical incantation "commercial speech," re-
sulting in exclusion of both the advertiser and the newspaper from the
First Amendment protection. Much of the media lawyer's time is
spent grappling with the practical application of these two concepts.
The constitutional issues raised in the process are not simply
whether a right of access should be guaranteed for the advertiser or
whether commercial speech should be protected under the First
* B.A., 1954, Yale University; M.A., 1956, Cambridge University; I.D., 1961,
Harvard Law School; Member, Washington Bar.
** B.A., 1965, Northwestern University; J.D., 1972, Northwestern University
School of Law; Member, Washington Bar.
1. As suggested by the title, this article is concerned primarily with commercial
speech in the context of the printed media. This is not meant to minimize the signifi-
cance of recent cases in the area of the broadcast media, but the treatment of broadcast-
ers as public trustees under the present regulatory framework raises additional considera-
tions beyond the scope of this article. Where broadcast cases are discussed, it is gener-
ally with a narrow focus on particular First Amendment issues.
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Amendment. Commercial advertising in the press serves a number of
functions, each of which raises its own peculiar questions under the
First Amendment.
1. Advertising is the economic base of the communications media.
It can hardly be denied that an absolute ban on commercial advertising
would be fatal to the mass media as we know it; however, the ban need
not be absolute or even a prohibition in form to have the same effect.
Any restriction which materially diminishes advertising revenues could
have a chilling effect on the functional viability of the press and thus
run afoul of the First Amendment.
2. At the same time, advertising is a form of communication for
which members of the media may be held responsible, both legally and
in the minds of the public.3 The decision to publish a given advertise-
ment or the ads of a given advertiser, as well as the form in which they
are published, are therefore matters of editorial judgment within the
scope of the First Amendment.
3. Advertising is also a means of access to the forum of the mass
media. As stated by the Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,4 advertising is
an important outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas
by persons who do not themselves have access to publishing facil-
ities-who wish to exercise their freedom of speech even though
they are not members of the press. . . . The effect [of excluding
paid advertising from First Amendment protection] would be to
shackle the First Amendment in its attempt to secure "the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources." 5
The role of advertising as a forum may create direct conflicts with the
media's right to control its content and editorial policies, as noted above.
4. Advertising is undeniably speech in its own right. Regardless
of whether the "product" being advertised is a new car, a political can-
didate or a social philosophy, an advertisement is a "dissemination of
information" which the public has at least an arguable First Amend-
ment right to receive. 6
2. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
3. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Peck v. Tribune
Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909).
4. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5. Id. at 266.
6. Cf. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972); Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969); Virginia Citizens Consumer Council v. State
Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Va. 1974). The Virginia case was decided
squarely on the First Amendment right of consumers to receive prescription drug price
information. See text accompanying note 143 infra.
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These multiple roles all too often 'have been ignored by the courts
in deciding questions involving advertising. In the words of one dis-
senting judge: "[lit does not follow . . . that the words 'product ad-
vertising' are a magical incantation which, when piously uttered, will
automatically decide cases without -the benefit of further thought.'
'
But in the past eighteen months, two significant Supreme Court deci-
sions have touched on each of these issues; one in the course of affirm-
ing restrictions on the press in its treatment of advertising,8 the other
in denying an enforced right of access to the press.' The interface of
these two cases raises intriguing questions about the status of advertis-
ing under the First Amendment and at the same time provides some
guidance -for future developments in the area of commercial speech.
The Commercial Speech Doctrine
Any discussion of advertising and the First Amendment must rec-
ognize that in many quarters and indeed in some courts, the subject
is a contradiction in terms. With the exception of political advertising 0
and public issue "advertorials," 11 advertising, -like obscenity, has been
pretty well drummed out of the First Amendment. But where obscen-
ity receives at least some ceremony of due process, commercial adver-
tising is often summarily dismissed on the basis of its label.
There are two assumptions at work here. The first has to do with
the nature of commercial advertising-the assumption that it is some-
how undignified and of less social value than other forms of speech.
The second is more an assumption about its treatment under the law-
a belief that the courts have already held "commercial speech" to be
totally without First Amendment protection. A closer analysis of how
the so-called "commercial speech doctrine" has actually been applied
may force some rethinking of both assumptions.
Valentine v. Chrestensen
The origin of 'the "commercial speech doctrine" is usually -traced
7. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 592 (D.D.C. 1971)
(Skelly Wright, J., dissenting).
8. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973). See text accompanying notes 87-110"infra.
9. Miami Herald Pub1. Co. v. Tornillo, 94 S. Ct. 2831 (1974). See text accom-
panying notes 123-34 infra.
10. Cf. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'1 Comm., 412 U.S.
94 (1973).
11. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Banzhaf v. FCC,
405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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to the following quotation from the 1942 Supreme Court decision in
Valentine v. Chrestensen:"2
This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper
places for the exercise of the freedom of communicating informa-
tion and disseminating opinion and that, though the states and
municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in the pub-
lic interest, they may not unduly burden or proscribe its employ-
ment in these public thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the
Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects
purely commercial advertising.13
The respondent, Chrestensen, was an enterprising promoter who
owned a submarine which he opened to the public for an admission
fee. His attempts to advertise this fact were frustrated by enforcement
of a New York City ordinance prohibiting distribution of "commercial
and business advertising matter" in the streets and other public places.
On advice of counsel, he changed his advertising handbill to remove
most of the puffery and added on the reverse side a protest against the
city's refusal to allow him to dock at a public pier. After being re-
strained from distributing the modified handbills, Chrestensen sued to
enjoin enforcement of the ordinance. An injunction was granted in the
federal district court' 4 and upheld by the Second Circuit15 on the basis
of earlier United States Supreme Court handbill cases which had held
similar ordinances unconstitutional as applied to distributors of religious
and political materials.' 6 On certiorari, the Supreme Court distin-
guished those cases in the language just quoted but avoided the admit-
tedly difficult question raised by the protest side of the handbill by find-
ing it to be a willful attempt -to evade the ordinance.
17
Read literally, the Chrestensen decision holds only that distribu-
tion of purely commercial advertising in the public streets may constitu-
tionally be prohibited. But the distinction between commercial adver-
tising and other information or opinion, on which the Court relied to
reach that conclusion, has far broader implications. The exact scope
of the distinction in Chrestensen remained undefined until 1973, when
the Supreme Court again confronted the issue in Pittsburgh Press Co.
v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations.'8 In the thirty years
12. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
13. Id. at 54 (emphasis added).
14. 34 F. Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
15. 122 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1941).
16. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938).
17. 316 U.S. at 55.
18. 413 U.S. 376, rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973).
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which intervened, however, many lower courts readily adopted Chres-
tensen as authority for a broad exception to the First Amendment, thus
excluding a substantial body of profit-tainted expression from 'the class
of protected speech.19
The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Lower Courts
The application of Valentine v. Chrestensen in the lower courts,
has not been as clear or consistent as one might expect of a "doctrine."-
The questions raised by Chrestensen remain largely unasked, let alone,
answered, -and in most cases there is no attempt to define either the,
scope or rationale of the distinction between commercial and noncom-
mercial speech.
Statements of the doctrine range from absolute declarations that
"the First Amendment deals with the free exchange of ideas and not
with commercial 'factual' speech," 20 to the almost affirmative statement
that "[e]ven advertisers enjoy first amendment rights, although it is
said that product advertising is 'less vigorously protected . . . than
other forms of speech.' ,"21 The great majority of cases, however, adopt
an approach similar to the Chrestensen decision, denying protection to
the specific commercial matter before the court without attempting to
meet the broader issue.22
For example, in E. F. Drew Co. v. FTC,2 3 petitioner, a distributor
of oleomargarine, challenged the constitutionality of Federal Trade
Commission restrictions on the use of certain "dairy product" terms in
its advertising. The court noted:
The Commission, relying on Valentine v. Chrestensen. . .replies
that all commercial advertising is without the protection of the First
Amendment. We -think it is sufficient -to state that Congress can
prohibit or control misleading advertising. . . without deprivation
19. See cases cited notes 20 & 22 infra.
20. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1306 (2d Cir. 1971); accord,
Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Va. 1969): "[Rlegulation of
commercial advertising does not intrude upon First Amendment rights of free speech."
Id. at 825.
21. Fur Information & Fashion Council, Inc. v. E.F. Timme & Son, 364 F. Supp:
16, 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
22. See, e.g., George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424F.2d
25, 33 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S 850 (1970); Regina Corp. v. FTC, 322 F.2d
765, 770 (3d Cir. 1963); Murray Space Shoe Corp. v. FTC, 304 F.2d 270, 272 (2d Cir.
1962); E.F. Drew & Co. v. FTC, 235 F.2d 735, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1956); American
Medicinal Prod., Inc. v. FTC, 136 F.2d 426, 427 (9th Cir. 1943).
23. 235 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1956).
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of First Amendment rights. There is no constitutional right to dis-
seminate false or misleading advertisements.
24
While this limited approach is undoubtedly sound judicial practice, it
does little to clarify either the scope or rationale of the commercial
speech doctrine.
A few recent opinions have attempted to define or explain the
doctrine, and while the results are largely dicta, they offer more guid-
ance than unanalyzed holdings of other cases. Judge Hufstedler's con-
curring opinion in Rowan v. United States Post Office Department,25
which upheld postal restrictions on the mailing of unsolicited erotic ma-
terial, avoided the mechanical distinction between commercial and non-
commercial speech with the following analysis:
The degree to -which the First Amendment applies to protect
speech varies with society's interest in the content of that speech.
"Purely commercial advertising" has never received the same kind
of constitutional protection as that afforded to expressions of
greater public concern. The commercial element does not alto-
gether destroy its quality as protected speech, but is does substan-
tially reduce the weight of the expression on constitutional
scales. 26
Judge Hufstedler concluded that the "peculiar quality of offensive-
ness '27 inherent in erotic material added greater weight to the public
interest in regulation. Whatever criticisms may be leveled at this bal-
ancing approach, ,the opinion is noteworthy in its treatment of the com-
mercial speech question as a First Amendment issue.
In a case involving similar subject matter, Hodges v. Fitle,28 the
district court for Nebraska defined the doctrine, focusing on the pur-
pose of the expression rather than its content:
If the activity classified as speech is conducted to communicate in-
formation or disseminate opinion, it is offered the fullest protection
of the First Amentment. . . . The distinction as to what separates
"purely commercial advertisement" from this type of case is that,
in the former, the expression is used, not to disseminate opinion
or communicate information, but to sell a product or service. 29
Applying -this distinction, the court reached a novel application of the
24. Id. at 739-40.
25. 300 F. Supp. 1036 (C.D. Cal. 1969), affd, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
26. Id. at 1044 (Hufstedler, J., concurring).
27. Id.
28. 332 F. Supp. 504 (D. Neb. 1971).
29. Id. at 509. With respect to the standard of First Amendment protection for
commercial advertisement, the court stated only that the restricted test of Valentine v.
Chrestensen would be applicable. Id.
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commercial speech doctrine, holding that topless dancing, if it was
"speech" at all, was "purely commercial advertising" within the mean-
ing of Valentine v. Chrestensen:
As the handbill in Chrestensen was used to promote a product,
so is the dancing here used to promote a product-the sale of alco-
holic beverages. 30
One of the few cases to suggest a rationale for excluding com-
mercial speech was Banzhaf v. FCC.31  While the court was primarily
concerned with interpretation of the "fairness doctrine" and the "pub-
lic interest" standard applicable to broadcasting, it devoted considerable
attention to First Amendment issues in the commercial context.
Banzhaf upheld an FCC requirement that broadcasters who carry ciga-
rette advertising also provide a significant amount of time for presenta-
tion of anticigarette messages. One group of petitioners argued that
the requirement would have a chilling effect on -the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms by discouraging cigarette advertising on radio
and television. The court answered:
The speech which might conceivably be "chilled" by this rul-
ing barely qualifies as constitutionally protected "speech." It is 'es-
tablished -that some utterances fall outside the pale of First Amend-
ment concern. Many cases indicate that product advertising is at
least less rigorously protected than other forms of speech. Promot-
ing the sale of a product is not ordinarily associated with any of
the interests the First Amendment seeks to protect. As a rule, it
does not affect the political process, does not contribute to the ex-
change of ideas, does not provide information on matters of public
importance, and is not, except perhaps for the ad-men, a form of
individual self-expression. It is rather a form of merchandising
subject -to limitation for public purposes like other -business prac-
tices.3
2
It is instructive to note that despite this persuasive distinction between
commercial speech and other forms of expression, the court did not ex-
clude advertising from the First Amendment and, in fact, went on to
frame its analysis in First Amendment terms, noting: "[E]ven if
cigarette commercials are protected speech, we think they are at best
a negligible 'part of any exposition of ideas, and are of. . .slight social
value as a step to truth. . . .' " In addition, the court found a coun-
tervailing First Amendment purpose which outweighed any inhibition
30. Id.
31. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom., National Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 396 U.S. 842-(1969).
32. 405 F.2d at 1101-02.
33, 1. t 1102,
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of the advertisers' "marginal" freedom of speech .
4
In a sequel to Banzhaf, the district court in Capital Broadcasting
Co. v. Mitchell,35 upheld the 1971 ban on cigarette advertising in the
electronic media. As in Banzhaf, the holding was based in large part
on "[t]he unique characteristics of electronic communication [which]
make it especially subject to regulation in the public interest," 36 but the
court also noted that "Congress [could] prohibit the advertising of cig-
arettes in any media" under either its power to regulate interstate com-
merce or its supervisory role over federal regulatory agencies. 37  The
constitutional implications of an absolute prohibition remained unex-
plored, since the petitioners were not the advertisers or manufacturers,
whose right to speak would clearly be abridged, but the broadcasters
who, in the words of the court, "lost no right to speak-[but] only lost
an ability to collect revenue from others for broadcasting their commer-
cial messages. 38  Despite this dicta, the court's approach was essen-
tially the same as that in Banzhaf; i.e., that "product advertising is less
vigorously protected than other forms of speech," and the restrictions
are justified by the "unique characteristics" of the broadcast media.39
In Fur Information & Fashion Council, Inc. v. E. F. Timme &
Son,4" the court stated that "[e]ven advertisers enjoy first amendment
rights," and that although "product advertising is 'less vigorously pro-
tected . . . than other forms of speech,' " any limitations on those
rights, however valid, "must be drawn narrowly, so as to meet the per-
ceived evil, without unnecessary impingement on the right of free
speech."41  The case involved a fur industry claim that the defendant,
a manufacturer of artificial furs, was engaged in a systematic campaign
of unfair competition, implying in its advertising that endangered
species were used by the fur industry. Finding that defendant's adver-
tising involved matters of public interest, the court refused to grant an
injunction on the basis of the traditional First Amendment prohibition
34. id. at 1102-03.
35. 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), ajf'd inem. sub nom., Capital Broadcasting
Co. v. Acting Att'y Gen., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
36. 333 F. Supp. at 584.
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 364 F. Supp. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). This case was decided on September 21,
1973, after the Supreme Court's decision in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973), but since it does not mention the decision,
it is discussed here in connection with other pre-Pittsburgh Press cases.
41. 364 F. Supp. at 22.
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against prior restraints42 and concluded instead -that the proper forum
for this dispute was the "marketplace of ideas.
43
It is not simply the holding that distinguishes the Fur Information
case from the other cases discussed. It is also the focus of the court
on the manner of regulation and its constitutional implications. The
case treats the commercial speech doctrine as a true exception to the
First Amendment, insisting on narrowly drawn restrictions in order to
leave the broadest possible area of speech protected. The court thus
goes one step beyond a simple definitional approach to consider the
effect of overly broad regulation on protected speech.
At least two other recent cases have raised First Amendment
issues beyond the question of whether commercial speech is itself pro-
tected. In United States v. Hunter,44 the appellant-newspaper chal-
lenged the 1968 Civil Rights Act prohibition against discriminatory ad-
vertising of housing.45 It argued that any distinction between commer-
cial advertising and other forms of expression was "meaningless in the
context of the newspaper publishing business," because the revenue
from advertising made possible publication of -the rest of the newspaper
and any restriction which discouraged advertising would therefore have
a chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights of the
press.46  The court acknowledged the validity of this argument in
theory but found on the particular facts that no such chilling effect
would occur.47
A similar argument was raised in a slightly different context in
SEC v. Wall Street Transcript Corp.4" There, the newspaper chal-
lenged -the issuance of subpoenas pursuant to an investigation by the
Securities and Exchange Commission to determine whether the publi-
cation was a "bona fide newspaper" or an "investment advisor" subject
42. See id.
43. Id. at 23, quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1968).
44. 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1970).
46. 459 F.2d at 212.
47. The court's reasoning on this point is convincing: "While it is true, as Hunter
contends in his brief, that 'a newspaper can be silenced as easily by cutting off its source
of funds, as it can be by enjoining its publication,' no such threat is raised by the Act's
prohibition of racially discriminatory advertisements. Nondiscriminatory advertise-
ments are still permitted. Since the Act also bars private publication of discriminatory
advertisements, an advertiser has no incentive to abandon his regular use of newspapers
to publicize his offer to sell or rent. We therefore doubt that the Act will deprive a
newspaper of any revenue." Id.
48. 422 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
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to regulation under the Investment Advisors Act.49 The Transcript
argued that the process of investigation would itself have a chilling
effect on the exercise of constitutionally protected rights of bona
fide newspapers.5" While acknowledging "that a demand for dis-
closure may have some deterrent effect upon speech," 51 the Second
Circuit nevertheless held that the SEC investigation was within permis-
sible limits. The court's treatment of the basic commercial speech
question elsewhere in the opinion may have influenced the ease with
which it reached this conclusion. Citing the language from Banzhaf
v. FCC that "[piromoting the sale of a product is not ordinarily asso-
ciated with any of the interests the First Amendment seeks to pro-
tect,"52 the court reasoned that the activities involved in giving commer-
cial investment advice are not necessarily entitled to the same First
Amendment protection accorded to particular forms of social, political,
or religious expression.53 With this reasoning, however, the court went
considerably beyond the type of product advertising usually excluded
and extended the commercial speech doctrine to the dissemination of
commercial information and opinion.
5 4
Despite the fact that both the Hunter and Wall Street Transcript
cases applied the commercial speech doctrine to reject First Amend-
ment protection, they are important in their recognition that restrictions
on commercial speech may involve other First Amendment issues un-
related to the question of whether the speech itself is protected.
If any common "doctrine" can be drawn from the majority of these
lower court cases, it is not that commercial speech is totally outside the
protection of the First Amendment, as is often assumed, but only that
commercial speech is entitled to less protection than other types of
speech. With the possible exception of the Fur Information 5 case,
which acknowledged limits on the manner of regulation, the exact de-
gree of protection has not been defined. In most cases, the axiom is
simply stated in support of the court's own denial of protection in the
49. 15 U.S.C. § 80(b-3) (1970).
50. 422 F.2d at 1380.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1379, citing 405 F.2d at 1101. See note 32 supra.
53. See 422 F.2d at 1379.
54. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964), which dis-
tinguished the unprotected advertising in Valentine from the protected advertisement be-
fore the Court on the basis that the former was "purely commercial advertising,"
whereas the latter "communicated information [and] expressed opinion." See also text
accompanying note 90 infra.
55. 364 F. Supp. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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particular case and followed by citation to Valentine v. Chrestensen.56
The lack of consistent development in the doctrine may be attrib-
uted, at least in part, to the Supreme Court's relative silence on the
commercial speech question. Between Valentine v. Chrestensen and
the decision in Pittsburgh Press, there are only a handful of cases in
which the doctrine is even mentioned.
The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court
After -the decision in Chrestensen, -the commercial speech doctrine
received some attention in the religious pamphleteering cases of the
1940's. 57 It then lapsed into a tenuous half-life in the footnotes of the
Supreme Court, surfacing only occasionally either as dicta in decisions
on other grounds or as the subject of criticism in separate opinions. It
was not squarely confronted as an independent ground for decision un-
til the 1973 decision in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Human Rela-
tions Commission.5" The occasional references in the intervening
period do, however, help to explain its rationale more fully than the
casual statement of the rule in Chrestensen.
In the period immediately following Chrestensen, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the distinction between commercial and noncommer-
cial speech in the context of commercial activity on the part of religious
groups; however, an important qualification on the commercial speech
doctrine emerged in the process. Initially the Court held that although
a state could tax the use by religious sects of ordinary commercial meth-
ods of sales (e.g., canvassing),59 it could not proscribe the distribution
of handbills designed to solicit funds for religious purposes (e.g., adver-
tising sales of religious literature). 60
In Murdock v. Pennsylvania,61 the Court recognized the possible
conflict and noted that "the problem of drawing the line between a
purely commercial activity and a religious one will at times be diffi-
cult."162 The court concluded that
the mere fact that the religious literature is "sold" by itinerant
preachers rather than "donated" does not transform evangelism
56. See, e.g., cases cited note 22 supra.
57. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Penn-
sylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942); Jamison v.
Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943).
58. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
59. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 597 (1942).
60. Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943).
61. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
62. Id. at 111.
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into a commercial enterprise. If it did, then the passing of the col-
lection plate in church would make the church serve a commercial
project. The constitutional rights of those spreading their religious
beliefs through the spoken and printed word are not to be gauged
by standards governing retailers or wholesalers of books. The right
to use the press for expressing one's views is not to be measured
by the protection afforded commercial handbills.6 3
The Murdock opinion, written by Justice Douglas, was at once a
reaffirmation of the commercial speech distinction of Valentine v.
Chrestensen and a warning that it should not be extended beyond that
context. More importantly, it refuted the simplistic argument that a
mere sale in connection with the exercise of First Amendment rights
converts these activities into commercial conduct within the state's regu-
latory power.
These principles appeared again in Breard v. Alexandria," which
upheld the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance which prohibited
door-to-door magazine sales. In a somewhat puzzling application of a
commercial speech distinction, the Court asserted that although the sale
of periodicals did not itself preclude First Amendment protection, it did
introduce a commercial element into the transaction.65 The opinion
went on to distinguish Martin v. City of Struthers,66 which had held in-
valid a similar prohibition as applied to religious solicitors, on the find-
ing that Martin involved no commercial element, as the solicitors there
sought only to distribute free invitations to religious services.67 Resting
its decision on the presence of the commercial component in the facts
before it, the Court concluded that the householder's interest in privacy
outweighed the publisher's desire to maximize sales.6" The Court dis-
pensed with the First Amendment arguments in the following words:
It would be, it seems to us, a misuse of the great guarantees of free
speech and free press to use those guarantees to force a community
to admit the solicitors of publications to the home premises of its
residents. We see no abridgement of the principles of the First
Amendment in this ordinance. 69
This formulation of the commercial speech doctrine, more implied
than stated, is difficult to square with either the prior cases7" or the
63. Id.
64. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
65. Id. at 642.
66. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
67. 341 U.S. at 643.
68. Id. at 644.
69. Id. at 645.
70. See text accompanying notes 59-63 supra.
[Vol. 26
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
later treatment m New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.7 ' On .the one hand,.
the Court recognized the First Amendment interest involved and
merely balanced it against the "householders' desire for privacy" At
the same time, the Court apparently relied on the "commercial ele-
ment" to remove the problem from the scope of the First Amendment.
The end result is a confusing decision which arguably could have been
determined solely on the issue of whether door-to-door solicitation was
a necessary part of the dissemination of the protected publications.
72
The clearest statement of the commercial speech doctrine prior to
the Pittsburgh Press decision came in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan.7 3  The Court there refused to apply the doctrine to a paid
editorial advertisement which
communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances,
protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf
of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the
highest public interest and concern.
7 4
Emphasizing -that the holding in Chrestensen was based on the fact that
the handbills were "purely commercial advertising," the Court rejected
the argument that payment for the ad placed it in the category of com-
mercial speech. Any other conclusion, -the Court noted, would dis-
courage newspaper publication of "editorial advertisements," thereby
limiting the freedom of speech of persons who lack access to alternative
publishing facilities. 75  The Court did not, however, consider what sta-
tus "purely commercial advertising" might have in the libel context.
76
Following New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court summarily
71. See text accompanying note 90 infra.
72. See 341 U.S. at 644. Shortly after Breard, Justice Douglas urged reconsidera-
tion of the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech m his often
quoted concurring opinion m Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513-15
(1959), noting that the ruling m Valentine v. Chrestensen "was casual, almost offhand,
[a]nd. . has not survived reflection." Id. at 514.
73. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
74. Id. at 266.
75. Id.
76. The New York Times decision requires a public official to prove that a state-
ment concerning his official conduct was made with knowledge of its falsity or reckless
disregard for its truth m order to recover damages for defamatory falsehood. In Rosen--
bloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), the Court extended the New York Times
libel rule to all communications involving matters of public concern; however, the Court
expressly refrained from stating a position "on the extent of constitutional protection,
if any, for purely commercial commumcations . ." Id. at 44 n.12. A 1974 decision
of the Supreme Court, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974), dealt with
the application of the New York Times rule to private individuals, and the Court again
avoided discussion of the constitutional status of purely commercial advertisements
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affirmed Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchel 77 and denied certiorari
in United States v. Hunter,'7 SEC v. Wall Street Transcript Corp."9 and
Banzhaf v. FCC,80 three of the more significant commercial speech
cases decided in the lower courts. Certiorari was also denied in Dun
& Bradstreet v. Grove8 1 which involved libel by a commercial credit re-
port. To this order, Justice Douglas filed a lengthy dissent restating
his position in Cammarano v. United States that any distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech8 2 should be abandoned and not-
ing the extent to which Valentine v. Chrestensen had been eroded by
subsequent cases.83
The status of the commercial speech doctrine in 1972, when the
Court granted certiorari in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commis-
sion on Human Relations,84 was therefore uncertain. Valentine v.
Chrestensen, although cited in the older handbill decisions and distin-
guished in the New York Times case, had never been squarely presented
to the Court. While there were convincing arguments in the Douglas
opinions and in New York Times -that the distinction was no longer
sound,85 -the question was explicitly left open in a footnote in Rosen-
bloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 80 Furthermore, Pittsburgh Press raised the
commercial speech doctrine in the context of newspaper advertising,
thus further complicating the issues with the addition of First Amend-
ment considerations unique to freedom of the press.
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations
Pittsburgh Presss' involved an ordinance of the City of Pittsburgh
77. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Att'y Gen., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972). See
note 35 & accompanying text supra.
78. 409 U.S. 934 (1972). See note 44 & accompanying text supra.
79. 398 U.S. 958 (1970). See note 48 & accompanying text supra.
80. National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). See note 31 & ac-
companying text supra.
81. 404 U.S. 898 (1971).
82. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
83. 404 U.S. at 905: "Surely we have eroded Valentine to the extent that it held
a commercial form of publication negated the applicability of the First Amendment.
Nor, in my view, should commercial content be controlling. The language of the First
Amendment does not except speech directed at private economic decisionmaking. Cer-
tainly such speech could not be regarded as less important than political expression.
When immersed in a free flow of commercial information, private sector decisionmaking
is at least as effective an institution as are our various governments in furthering the
social interest in obtaining the best general allocation of resources."
84. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
85. See notes 73-75, 81 & accompanying text supra.
86. 403 U.S. 29, 44 n.12 (1971). See note 76 supra.
87. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
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forbidding an "employer or Employment agency" from employment ad-
vertising which discriminates on the basis of sex. The ordinance also
forbade any person from "aiding in the doing" of any such act. The
Pittsburgh Human Relations Commission charged that the newspaper's
separate male and female help-wanted classifications in its advertising
columns constituted "aiding" in unlawful discrimination under the ordi-
nance. The commission issued a cease and desist order against -the
maintenance of the sex-designated classification system which was
modified by the Commonwealth Court of 'Pennsylvania. The Su-
preme Court affirmed the order, as modified, primarily on the ground
that the advertising at issue was purely commercial speech .
9
Stated simply, Pittsburgh Press reaffirmed the commercial speech
doctrine of Valentine v. Chrestensen. However, in doing so, the Court
was careful to limit its decision to the facts at hand and to reserve other
significant First Amendment issues in the commercial context. In this
sense it might also be seen as the first step in defining the limits of
the commercial speech doctrine as applied to the press.
The Court undeniably recognized the Chrestensen distinction be-
tween commercial and noncommercial speech, comparing the adver-
tisement in Chrestensen to that in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan:
The critical feature of the advertisement in Valentine v.
Chrestensen was that, in the Court's view, it did no more -than pro-
pose a commercial transaction, the sale of admission to a subma-
rine. In New York Times v. Sullivan, Mr. Justice Brennan, for the
Court, found the Chrestensen advertisement easily distinguishable:
"The publication here was not a 'commercial' advertisement in the
sense in which the word was used in Chrestensen. It communi-
cated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested
claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a move-
ment whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest
public interest and concern." 376 U.S., at 266. In the crucial re-
spects, the advertisements in the present record resemble the
Chrestensen rather than the [New York Times] advertisement.
None expresses a position on whether, as a matter of social policy,
certain positions ought to be filled by members of one or the other
sex, nor does any of them criticize the Ordinance or the Commis-
sion's enforcement practices. Each is no more than a proposal of
possible employment. The advertisements are thus classic ex-
ampled of commercial speech. 90
Had the Court ended its inquiry here and simply affirmed the
commission's order on the basis of this finding, one could argue that
88. 4 Pa. Commw. 448, 287 A.2d 161 (1972).
89. 43 U.S. at 385, 391,
9Q1 14. at 385,
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purely commercial advertising is outside the realm of First Amendment
protection. But in the remainder of the Court's opinion, specific limita-
tions on the application of the doctrine are carefully delineated in what,
for the sake of discussion, may be classified as -three general categories.
1. Institutional or Financial Threat to the Press
The Court stated:
At the outset . . it is important to identify with some care the
nature of the alleged abridgment. This is not a case in which the
challenged law arguably disables the press by undermining its insti-
tutional viability.
.. . Nor does Pittsburgh Press argue that the Ordinance
threatens its financial viability or impairs in any significant way its
ability to publish and distribute its newspaper. 9'
Without citing the specific cases, this limitation recognizes the type of
arguments raised in United States v. Hunter92 and SEC v. Wall Street
Transcript Corp.,93 discussed earlier. The implication is that if such
a threat or impairment could be shown, it could render unconstitutional
an otherwise valid regulation of commercial speech.
2. Editorial Judgment of the Press
Having found the advertisements to be "classic examples of com-
mercial speech, ' 94 the Court next considered the newspaper's argument
that its editorial judgment regarding acceptance and placement of the
advertisement, as opposed to the commercial content of the ad itself,
should be dispositive of .the issue. The Court acknowledged the exer-
cise of judgment in allowing the advertiser to select the "male" or "fe-
male" column for a particular ad,93 but it quite predictably found the
degree of "judgment" to be insufficient to separate it from the commer-
cial character of the ad. The Court concluded that the column heading
and advertisement comprised an integrated commercial statement
"which conveys essentially the same message as an overtly discrimina-
tory want ad. .. "96 But the Court was quick to affirm protection
91. Id. at 382-83.
92. 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972). Hunter argued
that "a newspaper can be silenced as easily by cutting off its source of funds, as it can
be by enjoining its publication." 459 F.2d at 212.
93. 422 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970). The Transcript
argued that investigations and subpoenas by the SEC would interfere with its ability to
investigate, criticize, and otherwise carry out its traditional journalistic functions.
94. 413 U.S. at 385.
95. Id. at 386.
96. Id. at 388.
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for such editorial judgment in other contexts:
Nor, a fortiori, does our decision authorize any restriction whatever,
whether of content or layout, on stories or commentary originated
by Pittsburgh Press, its columnists, or its contributors. On the con-
trary, we reaffirm unequivocally -the protection afforded to editorial
judgment and to the free expression of views on these and other
issues, however controversial.97
Further, the Court left open the possibility that even in the context
of purely commercial advertising, some editorial judgments might war-
rant constitutional protection:
Under some circumstances, at least, a newspaper's editorial
judgments in connection with an advertisement take on the char-
acter of the advertisement ....
Similarly, a commercial advertisement remains commercial in
the hands of the media, at least under some circumstances ...
[T]he exercise of this kind of editorial judgment does not neces-
sarily strip commercial advertising of its commercial character.98
The effect of this apparently intentional hedge is to leave an area of
editorial discretion between the "integrated commercial statement" of
the Pittsburgh Press ads and the protected expression of controversial
views in "stories or commentary," the exercise of which might be con-
sidered truly "editorial" and thus protected despite the clear commer-
cial nature of the underlying advertisement.
At the risk of stating the obvious, it should be stressed that at this
point in the opinion the Court had not yet determined the basic issue.
It had held only that the advertisements were purely commercial speech
and that the newspaper's exercise of judgment took on that commercial
character. But the Court had not stated that commercial speech was
unprotected by the First Amendment; -that question was subsequently
answered only in the narrowest context.
3. "Legal" Commercial Activity
The Pittsburgh Press argued that even if the combination of
advertisement and placement were to be treated as commercial speech,
there should be no distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech under the First Amendment.99 The Court answered:
Whatever the merits of this contention may be in other con-
97. Id. at 391.
98. Id. at 386-87 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 388. The newspaper's argument was essentially the same as that urged
by Justice Douglas in his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Dun & Bradstreet v.
Grove, 404 U.S. 898 (1971), i.e., that "the exchange of information is as important in
the commercial realm as in any other ... ." 413 U.S. at 388.
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texts, it is unpersuasive in this case. Discrimination in employment
is not only commercial activity, it is illegal commercial activity
under the Ordinance ...
• . . Any First Amendment interest which might be served by
advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which might argu-
ably outweigh the governmental interest supporting the regulation
is altogether absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal
and the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation
on economic activity. 100
On first reading, this distinction suggests that prohibition of dis-
criminatory advertising is constitutional because discriminatory advertis-
ing is prohibited. Closer analysis, however, indicates some substance
in the distinction and suggests a third limitation on the Court's holding.
Discrimination in employment, by the Court's logic, is illegal com-
mercial activity comparable to the sale of narcotics or solicitation for
prostitution. 101  Commercial advertising of such activity therefore
serves no valid First Amendment interest. However, where the under-
lying economic activity is not illegal, the Court noted the possibility that
the First Amendment interest underlying advertising of "an ordinary
commercial proposal" might outweigh the government's interest in reg-
ulation.
102
To find substance in the distinction is not to ignore serious prob-
lems with the Court's approach. If a distinction is to be drawn between
"legal" and "illegal" commercial activity, it would appear that govern-
ment policy need only be translated into a legal prohibition to justify
restrictions on the press. Justice Stewart, in a dissenting opinion,
stated:
The Court today holds that a government agency can force
a newspaper publisher to print his classified advertising pages in
a certain way in order to carry out governmental policy. After this
decision, I see no reason why government cannot force a newspaper
publisher to conform in the same way in order to achieve other
goals thought socially desirable. 10 3
The opinion of the Court, however, stated:
We hold only that the Commission's modified order, narrowly
drawn -to prohibit placement in sex-designated columns of adver-
tisements for nonexempt job opportunities, does not infringe the
First Amendment rights of Pittsburgh Press. 0 4
100. 413 U.S. at 388-89.
101. Id. at 388.
102. Id. at 389.
103. Id. at 403 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 391.
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There is a temptation to read into the Court's disclaimer a distinction,
based perhaps on principles of malum prohibitum and malum in se, to
avoid the apparent conflict, but there is little in the opinion itself to
suggest or support such an analysis. 10 5
There is, however, an implied distinction between commercial and
noncommercial advertising of illegal activity. A noncommercial adver-
tisement or "advertorial" urging or even aiding in conduct which is il-
legal would presumably be subjected to a different test. This is not
to say its publication would necessarily go unpunished, but one might
expect the traditional tests of the First Amendment to be 'applied.10
This implied distinction may be given substance in the very near future.
The case of Bigelow v Virginia,07 before the Court at this writing,
challenges the conviction of a newspaper editor for publication of an
advertisement giving information about out-of-state abortion services.
Unless the Court is able to find "purely commercial speech" in this con-
troversial area, its treatment of the illegal subject matter in this context
may help to clarify the holding of Pittsburgh Press.
While Pittsburgh Press did not overrule Valentine v. Chresten-
sen, 08 as many had hoped it would, it did both significantly narrow the
definition of commercial speech and suggest guidelines for narrowing
future applications of the doctrine. It is also interesting to note that
the issues left open by the Court roughly correspond to the various roles
of advertising suggested at the beginning of -this article. 0 9 The "finan-
cial threat" limitation recognizes the role of advertising as the economic
base of a free press; the "editorial judgment" limitation recognizes that
advertising is part of the content of the media; and the "illegal subject
matter" limitation leaves open the possibility that a lawful advertise-
ment may be speech entitled to some protection in its own right. The
105. See Note, Commercial Speech-An End in Sight to Chrestensen?, 23 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1258, 1269 n.62 (1974), which suggests that Pittsburgh Press might have been
decided solely on the basis of the illegality which was promoted by the advertisements,
without reference to Valentine v. Chrestensen and the commercial speech doctrine. Al-
though the logic of this observation is appealing, such a holding could easily have swept
too broadly. Consider, for example, a noncommercial advertisement protesting an exist-
ing law and furthering the unlawful conduct. Under a strict "illegality" theory, such
a protest might not be protected, whereas under the Court's reasoning, it is at least ar-
guably subject to First Amendment analysis. See text accompanying notes 106-07 infra.
106. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (distinction between ad-
vocacy of abstract doctrine and incitement to action under Smith Act).
107. 214 Va. 341, 200 S.E.2d 680 (1973), probable juris. noted, 94 S. Ct. 3201
(1974).
108. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
109. $ee notes 2-6 & accompanying text supra,
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one category not raised in Pittsburgh Press-that of advertising as a
means of access to the mass media-was considered by the Court in
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo," ° decided less than a year
later.
The Right of Access
In sharp contrast to the confused career of the commercial speech
doctrine in the courts, the issue of access to the press has been a model
of consistency. Almost without exception, the courts have held that
the business of publishing a newspaper is a private enterprise with no
legal obligation to sell advertising space to anyone."' In short, a news-
paper may discriminate in the acceptance or rejection of advertising,
even if the effect is demonstrably damaging to an advertiser who lacks
a substitute forum for his ads. The only significant limitations on this
doctrine are the prohibitions of the antitrust laws" 2 and the peculiar
position of broadcasters under the public interest standard of the Fed-
eral Communications Act." 3  Otherwise, the press remains free
to decide independently which advertisements it will publish and in
what form.
A sophisticated line of attack on this rule has developed in recent
years, and, although it is largely laid to rest in the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,"4 it is worthwhile
to consider these arguments, in view of the fact that Tornillo did not
involve commercial advertising. Moreover, since the subject matter in
Tornillo was specifically placed by the Court within the exception noted
in Pittsburgh Press for "stories or commentary" and "the free expres-
sion of views on [controversial] issues," 1 r5 some room still remains for
110. 94 S. Ct. 2831 (1974).
111. See Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir.
1971); Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971); Resident Participation of Denver, Inc. v.
Love, 322 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Colo. 1971); Approved Personnel v. Tribune Co., 177 So.
2d 704 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Schuck v. Carroll Daily Herald, 215 Iowa 1276, 247
N.W. 813 (1933); Bloss v. Federated Publications, Inc., 5 Mich. App. 74, 145 N.W.2d
800 (1966); Poughkeepsie Buying Service, Inc. v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc., 205
Misc. 982, 131 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct. 1954). Contra, Uhlman v. Sherman, 31 Ohio
Dec. 54 (C.P. Defranie County 1919).
112. See Loraine Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
113. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom.,
National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
114. 94 S. Ct. 2831 (1974).
115. Id. at 2838.
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arguments that a right of access should be recognized in the commercial
context.
Two key examples of this attack in the lower courts are Amalga-
mated Clothing Workers v. Tribune Publishing Co.116 and Associates
& Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co." 7 In Amalgamated Clothing Work-
ers a garment workers union picketed major department stores in a
campaign to limit the importation of foreign clothing. The stores were
major advertisers in -the defendant newspapers, and one of them,
Marshall Field & Co., shared common ownership with one of the de-
fendants. In the course of the controversy, the union submitted a full-
page advertisement which depicted a picket line beneath the well-
known Marshall Field clock and explained .the union's position. The
newspapers refused to publish the ad. The union sued to compel pub-
lication, arguing that a "special relationship" existed between the news-
paper publishing industry and the state through which the defendant
newspapers received "economic benefit and favored treatment flowing
from public sources as a result of the statutes, ordinances and cus-
tom.""n8 This relationship, they asserted, converted the newspapers'
censorship into "state action" infringing the First Amendment rights of
the union and its members." 9
The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the dis-
trict court's summary judgment for the defendant. The court cited the
traditional concept of the role of the press in the following words:
Rather than regarded as an extension of the state exercising
delegated powers of a governmental nature, the press has long and
consistently been recognized as an independent check on govern-
mental power ...
In sum, the function. of the press from the days -the Constitu-
tion was written to the present time has never been conceived as
anything but a private enterprise, free and independent of govern-
ment control and supervision. Rather than state power and par-
ticipation pervading the operation of the press, the news media and
the government have had a history of disassociation.
120
The court, in essence, affirmed the established rule that private censor-
ship is not prohibited by the First Amendment. It did not reach the
question of What effect enforcing a right of access might have on the
First Amendment rights of the newspaper.
116. 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971).
117. 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971).
118. 435 F.2d at 473.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 474.
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The same result was reached in the context of product advertising
in Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co.,' 21 a Ninth Circuit
case. There, an ad for the motion picture "The Killing of Sister
George" was accepted by the Los Angeles Times on the condition that
certain parts of the ad be removed. The film's producers sued the
Times to enjoin "any form of censorship of motion picture advertis-
ing' 122 on the same basic theory relied on in Amalgamated Clothing
Workers, i.e., that the newspaper's interference constituted state action.
To reach this argument, however, the plaintiffs cited the newspaper's
"semi-monopoly and quasi-public position" rather than the specific cat-
alogue of special favors cited in Amalgamated Clothing Workers.1
2 3
The court of appeals joined the Seventh Circuit in rejecting this state
action argument; however, it also stated:
Appellant has not convinced us that the courts or any other govern-
mental agency should dictate the contents of the newspaper.
There is no difference between compelling publication of ma-
terial that the newspaper wishes not to print and prohibiting a
newspaper from printing news or other material.
124
In what appears to be an afterthought, the court noted the commercial
nature of the plaintiffs advertisement and stated, "[This type of com-
mercial exploitation is subject to less protection than other types of
speech,"' 2' 5 citing Valentine v. Chrestensen.
The state action argument of -these cases was laid to rest, at least
implicitly, in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Na-
tional Committee.'26  There, the Supreme Court refused to recognize
the argument even in the context of -the highly regulated broadcast
media and upheld the broadcasters' right to reject political advertising.
In dicta comparing newspapers and broadcasters, it also noted that
[tlhe power of a privately owned newspaper to advance its own
political, social, and economic views is bounded by only two fac-
tors: first, the acceptance of a sufficient number of readers-and
hence advertisers-to assure financial success; and, second, the
journalistic integrity of its editors and publishers.' 27
In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,28 which unequivo-
121. 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971).
122. Id. at 134.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 135.
125. Id. at 136.
126. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
127. Id. at 117.
128. 94 S. Ct, 2831 (1974).
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cally reaffirmed this principle of journalistic independence, the issue
of enforced access to the press was raised not by private individuals,
but by legislation requiring "equal space" for any political candidate
whose record was attacked in a newspaper.12 9 It was also raised in
a distinctly noncommercial context. Nevertheless, the holding in
Tornillo appears to be broad enough -to affirm effectively both -the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers and the Associates & Aldrich cases.
In its concluding paragraph, the Court stated simply:
A newspaper is more than a passive receptable or conduit for news,
comment, and advertising. The choice of material to go into a
newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on -the size of
the paper, and content, and treatment of public issues and public
officials-whether fair or unfair---constitutes the exercise of editor-
ial control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how gov-
ernmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised con-
sistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they
have evolved to this time. Accordingly, the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Florida is reversed.' 3 0
This conclusion is based on essentially the same argument ad-
vanced by the Pittsburgh Press-i.e., -that the acceptance and place-
ment of materials in the newspaper are matters of editorial judgment
entitled to First Amendment protection."3 ' But where the application
of this argument was rejected in Pittsburgh Press, it was squarely af-
firmed in the noncommercial context of Tornillo. In addition to recog-
nizing protection for -the editorial judgment of -the press, the Court also
acknowledged the institutional and financial threat inherent in an en-
forced right of access. Noting first that "[g]overnmental restraint on
publishing need not fall into familiar or traditional patterns to be subject
to constitutional limitations . . ."I" the Court found such a restraint
in the financial burden imposed by an enforced right of reply:
The Florida statute exacts a penalty on -the basis of the content of
a newspaper. The first phase of -the penalty resulting from the
compelled printing of a reply is exacted in terms of the cost in
129. FLA. STAT. § 104.38: "If any newspaper in its columns assails the personal
character of any candidate for nomination or for election in any election, or charges
said candidate with malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise attacks his official
record, or gives to another free space for such purpose, such newspaper shall upon re-
quest of such candidate immediately publish free of cost any reply he may make thereto
in as conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type as the matter that calls for such
reply, provided such reply does not take up more space than the matter replied to. Any
person or firm failing to comply with the provisions of this section shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082 or § 775.803."
130. 94 S. Ct. at 2840.
131. See note 95 & accompanying text supra.
132. 94 S. Ct. at 2839.
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printing and composing time and materials and in taking up space
that could be devoted to other material the newspaper may have
preferred to print ... [I]t is not correct to say that, as an eco-
nomic reality, a newspaper can proceed to infinite expansion of its
column space to accommodate the replies that a government
agency determines or a statute commands the readers should have
available.133
This burden, the Court found, constituted a classic example of an im-
permissible "chilling effect" on the free exercise of the press:
Faced with 'the penalties that would accrue to any newspaper that
published news or commentary arguably within the reach of the
right of access statute, editors might well conclude that the safe
course is to avoid controversy and that, under the operation of the
Florida statute, political and electoral coverage would be blunted
or reduced. Government enforced right of access inescapably
"dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.'
'13 4
The clear effect of Tornillo can be summarized in the Court's own
language: "[A]ny such a compulsion to publish that which '"reason"
tells [a newspaper] should not be published' is unconstitutional."'
13
But what if "that which should not be published" is a purely commercial
advertisement? Although Tornillo did not reach the question, there
is nothing in the opinion to suggest that the same rule would not apply.
In fact, the Court cited with approval Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times
Mirror Co.13 6 which, as noted above, denied access to just such an ad-
vertisement. 37  Furthermore, the Court stated that "a newspaper is
more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and ad-
vertising."'38 While it is true that Justice White's concurring opinion
cited Pittsburgh Press as an example of "[wihatever power may reside
in government to influence the publishing of certain narrowly circum-
scribed categories of material ... the right of a newspaper to re-
fuse publication of a purely commercial advertisement appears to be
established by Tornillo.'40
133. Id.
134. Id., quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
135. 94 S. Ct. at 2839.
136. Id. at 2838.
137. See note 124 & accompanying text supra.
138. 94 S. CL at 2840 (emphasis added).
139. Id. at 2841 (White, J., concurring).
140. See also Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 94 S. Ct. 2714 (1974) (decided
the same day as Tornillo). The Lehman Court held that a city-owned transit system
could refuse advertising space inside city buses, so long as the policy was not applied
arbitrarily. In dicta, the Court noted "[iun much the same way that a newspaper or
periodical, or even a radio or television station, need not accept every proffer of adver-
tising from the general public, a city transit system has discretion to develop and make
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Commercial Speech After Pittsburgh Press and Tornillo
It is too early at this writing to cite application of Tornillo in the
lower courts, but several noteworthy cases in the commercial speech
area have been reported since Pittsburgh Press, each representing a
slightly different application of the newly-revived commercial speech
doctrine.
Associated Students v. Attorney General4' challenged a postal
ban against materials publicizing abortion services or materials, as ap-
plied to a student publication on birth control. Applying the New York
Times/Chrestensen42 distinction to the plaintiffs' publication, the court
paraphrased Pittsburgh Press, finding:
Mhe materials here resemble the [New York Times] rather than
the Chrestensen advertisement.- They express a position on social
policy and criticize many of the prevailing family planning ideas.
They are classic examples of non-commercial speech. 143
As indicated by the court, the case does not really involve com-
mercial speech and therefore borrows little from Pittsburgh Press ex-
cept the implication that a "commercial" advertisement for abortion
services might be prohibited.
In Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 44 the court upheld an anti-
blockbusting ordinance which prohibited use of "For Sale" signs in cer-
tain residential areas of Gary, Indiana. The opinion is significant for
its carefully studied application of Pittsburgh Press. The court first ac-
knowledged that "the Gary ordinance is directed at signs that merely
'[piropose a commercial transaction,' ,,'4" and applied the "illegal subject
matter" analysis of Pittsburgh Press, noting that the ordinance was also
directed at illegal discrimination. However, rather than rest its decision
on this easy conclusion, the court also noted that "'For Sale' signs are
forbidden even if they do not contain an explicit reference to race."' 46
Instead, the court squarely faced the fact that use of the signs in a
blockbusting campaign did indeed communicate a message to neighbors
and visitors as well as to purchasers:
In a sense, the very purpose of the ordinance is censorial. First
reasonable choices concerning the type of advertising that may be displayed in its vehi.
cles." Id. at 2717 (emphasis added).
141. 368 F. Supp. 11 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
142. See note 90 & accompanying text supra.
143. See 368 F. Supp. at 24.
144. 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974).
145. Id. at 163.
146. Id.
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Amendment as well as commercial interests are therefore affected
by this ordinance. 141
The court upheld the ordinance under a traditional First Amendment
analysis, focusing on the fact that the regulated speech also involved
conduct and that alternate means of communication were available.1
4 8
A third case, Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v. State
Board of Pharmacy, 49 overturned a Virginia law against advertisement
of prescription drug prices. Relying on Pittsburgh Press, the court
found a First Amendment interest in the right of consumers to have
this price information which, in the court's view, outweighed the gov-
ernmental interest in prohibition:
The right-to-know is the foundation of the First Amendment;
it is the theme of this suit. Consumers are denied this right by
the Virginia statute. It is on this premise that we grant the plain-
tiffs the injunction and the declaration -they ask. 150
However, the court left unchallenged an earlier decision by its sister
court for the Western District of Virginia, Patterson Drug Co. v.
Kingery,' 5' which had upheld the same price advertising restrictions
against a challenge by pharmacists. In a questionable distinction, the
court noted that the pharmacists' argument rested on "a prima facie
commercial approach" and -that consequences to consumers were not
discussed because they were not raised. 52
A fourth case, Carpets by the Carload, Inc. v. Warren,5 3 raised
both right of access and commercial speech issues with an interesting
twist. Plaintiff was an advertiser who had been denied newspaper
space on normal credit terms after the newspaper received notice of
a statutory consumer protection action against the business. Plaintiff
challenged the constitutionality of both the statute and the newspaper's
action on First Amendment grounds, claiming that the attorney gen-
147. Id. at 164.
148. Id.
149. 373 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Va. 1974).
150. Id. at 687.
151. 305 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Va. 1969).
152. 373 F. Supp. at 686. Read literally, this distinction would require a token
"consumer" to be among named plaintiffs before the First Amendment interest in receiv-
ing information could be raised. Such an application would be wholly inconsistent with
the Supreme Court decisions noted in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 763 (1972),
protecting the First Amendment rights of persons not before the court. See, e.g., Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-90 (1969); Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 534 (1945); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). The dis-
tinction did, however, avoid what would otherwise have been an uncomfortable conflict
of authority between the district courts of Virginia.
153. 368 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
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eral's notice -to the newspaper converted its refusal into either state ac-
tion or a conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of its First Amendment rights.154
The court cited Pittsburgh Press for the proposition that "commercial
advertising is not protected by -the freedom of speech and press pro-
visions of the first amendment"' '55 and held that "an advertiser does
not have a constitutional right to access to a newspaper.'
'1 56
With the exception of the extremely broad interpretation of Pitts-
burgh Press to support the denial of access, the case itself is not remark-
able. But the circumstances under which it arose and the court's obser-
vation that the attorney general might have brought action against the
newspaper 57 suggest a new range of practical problems for the press.
The combination of Pittsburgh Press, which sanctions regulation of ad-
vertising, and Tornillo, which upholds the right to refuse advertising,
may raise fundamental questions regarding freedom of the press.
Taken together, Pittsburgh Press and Tornillo state an apparent
rule that a newspaper may discriminate by refusing commercial adver-
tising altogether, but once it honors the advertiser's request, its treat-
ment of the ad may be regulated to prevent discrimination or to further
any "valid limitation on economic activity."' 58 If such limitation carries
with it restrictions on the content of advertising and sanctions against
the newspaper, the end result is that -the press may be penalized for
granting access.
If a newspaper has any doubt as to the compliance of an adver-
tisement with state or federal regulations, the risk of sanctions against
the paper itself creates strong pressure to refuse publication, regardless
of its own desires or editorial policy. But the effect of these pressures
may be to constrict the principal outlet for dissemination of information
and ideas available to those who are not members of the press' 59 -the
very result the Court sought to avoid in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan'160 and Associated Press v. United States.16' Proponents of a
broad commercial speech exception will of course argue that there is
154. Id. at 1076.
155. Id. at 1078.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1077.
158. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 389 (1973).
159. Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964). See text
accompanying note 5 supra.
160. 376 U.S. at 266.
161. 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (purpose of the First Amendment to secure "the widest
possiblp dissemination Qf information from diverse and antagonistic sources").
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no real loss since commercial advertising serves none of the interests
normally associated with the First Amendment. 162  In short, no "infor-
mation and ideas" in the constitutional sense are involved. The defect
in this argument is its focus on only the question of free speech and
its failure to recognize the inherent threats to the freedom of the press
as an institution under the First Amendment.
First is the ironic fact that the decision not to print, defended in
Tornillo as a constitutionally protected exercise of editorial judgment,
may as a practical matter be compelled by the threat of state-imposed
sanctions. Secondly, there may be a real financial threat to the news-
paper, not only in the form of economic sanctions, but also in the ad-
ministrative costs of reviewing ads to insure compliance with state and
federal laws. If these costs and the threat of sanctions are great
enough, the newspaper may be forced to forego revenue from certain
types of advertising altogether. One need not posit the extreme situa-
tion in which the newspaper is forced out of business to find an uncon-
stitutional chilling effect. As noted in Tornillo63 and Columbia Broad-
casting Systems, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,14 the amount
of advertising revenue has a direct relationship to the ability of the press
to provide adequate news coverage. If the Carpets case, discussed
above,' 65 had involved a threatened suit against the newspaper for de-
ceptive advertising by automobile dealers or other major advertisers as
a class, the financial impact and resulting chilling effect on the press
would be obvious. Of course, a newspaper can avoid the threat of such
actions by simply insisting on compliance by the advertisers before it
agrees to publish. It is here that the most subtle and yet most serious
effect of the commercial speech doctrine is felt.
The practical effect of Pittsburgh Press and Tornillo may be to
convert the press into a regulatory arm of the government. If, as Jus-
tice Stewart suggests, Pittsburgh Press holds that the newspaper can be
forced "to carry out government policy"' 66 in its advertising pages,
Tornillo provides the most effective tool for enforcement of that policy
against the advertisers. Whereas the state's enforcement efforts are
confined to legal action consistent with due process of the law, the
162. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom.
National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). See also Note, Freedom of
Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 H~Av. L. REv. 1191 (1965).
163. 94 S. Ct. at 2839 n.22.
164. 412 U.S. at 117.
165. See note 153 & accompanying text supra.
166. 413 U.S. at 403 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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newspaper now reluctantly wields the ultimate sanction against violation
of advertising regulations-it can summarily refuse to publish any ad-
vertisement that might pose a risk of violation, a fact which will not
be lost on legislatures and government agencies. There will be a great
temptation to shift the burden of enforcement from the government to
the media by simply enacting provisions making the media liable for
publication of any offending advertisements. Not only does this re-
move the risk and expense of lengthy court proceedings, but it also
shifts the expense of careful day to day review and enforcement directly
to the media.
It is one thing for a newspaper to choose to enforce government
policy in this manner, and some newspapers may even have an affirma-
tive policy in this regard. It is an entirely different matter, however,
if the press is forced into such a role by the threat of sanctions against
it. The traditional function of the press has been that of an independ-
ent check on governmental action, requiring a healthy distance between
press and government. To compel enforcement of government policy
by the press is a dangerous encroachment on this independence which
undermines the purposes of the First Amendment.
Obviously, a further narrowing of the distinction between com-
mercial and noncommercial speech would reduce the impact of these
problems by reducing the amount and complexity of regulation over ad-
vertising. It is crucial to recognize, however, that even total abrogation
of the commercial speech doctrine will not eliminate the problem. As
the decision in Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary' 67 suggests, it is en-
tirely possible for regulation of advertising to be upheld on traditional
First Amendment analysis, leaving the newspapers in exactly the same
position with respect to regulations which are held valid. The First
Amendment issues affecting the press are therefore not so much mat-
ters of free speech as they are questions of interference with the free-
dom of the press as a viable, independent institution. The failure to
distinguish these issues can have a serious impact on the First Amend-
ment interests of the media.
Consider, for example, the courts' treatment of the loss of revenue
in Banzhaf v. FCC68 and Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell.'69 In
Banzhaf, the court found it unlikely that cigarette advertising would be
"chilled" by the requirement that it carry antismoking messages, in light
167. 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974).
168. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
169. 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971).
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of the fact that cigarette advertising accounted for more than 7 percent
of all television advertising revenues and nearly $300,000,000 annually
to radio and television combined. 170 In the Capital Broadcasting case,
which upheld a total ban on radio and television cigarette advertising,
the court noted that the resulting loss of revenue might "affect [broad-
casters] with sufficient First Amendment interest" to raise a constitu-
tional challenge, but concluded:
Finding nothing in the Act or its legislative history which precludes
a broadcast licensee from airing its own point of view on any aspect
of the cigarette smoking question, it is clear that petitioners' speech
is not at issue. Thus, contrary to the assertions made by petition-
ers, Section 6 does not prohibit them from disseminating informa-
tion about cigarettes, and, -therefore, does not conflict with the exer-
cise of their First Amendment rights. 171
This approach equates First Amendment rights solely with the freedom
to "air one's point of view" and says nothing about the impact of lost
revenues on the broadcasters' ability to "disseminate information" gen-
erally. It may well be that the broadcasters, like the newspaper in
United States v. Hunter, 72 would not be able to show sufficient loss
of revenues to sustain a "chilling effect" argument, but -this issue cannot
be resolved by a finding that freedom to speak about cigarettes is pre-
served.
Conclusion
Perhaps the most hopeful indication in Pittsburgh Press and
Tornillo is the recognition, in each, of the multiplicity of issues in-
volved, including those specifically affecting freedom of the press.
Despite the questionable result and reasoning of Pittsburgh Press, it
does acknowledge those First Amendment interests of the press which
extend beyond the simple question of whether commercial speech is
to be protected. Tornillo goes further in reaffirming the strength of
those interests and provides a well-reasoned framework for future anal-
ysis in the area of commercial speech.
Before Pittsburgh Press, there may have been an element of false
optimism among media lawyers, a belief or hope that -the Supreme
Court was moving away from the commercial speech doctrine and
would, if invited, eventually overrule Chrestensen. That opportunity
has now been presented and declined by the Court in such a way as
170. 405 F.2d at 1102 n.83.
171. 333 F. Supp. at 584.
172. 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 409 US. 934 (1972).
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to invite resolution of many of the issues left unanswered by the lower
courts. It is now clear that resolution of these issues may involve much
more than simply overruling the commercial speech doctrine. Thus,
while the time may have passed for urging absolute First Amendment
protection for all advertising, the narrower, and in many ways more sig-
nificant issues suggested in Pittsburgh Press and Tornillo are now ripe
for determination.

